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CASE NOTES
Patent Law—Computer Programs—Unpatentable Mental Process—
Gottschalk v. Benson.'—In 1963 Benson and Tabbot filed an applica-
tion with the Patent Office.' They sought a patent for a method de-
scribed in their specification' as being related "to the processing of data
by program and more particularly to the programmed conversion of
numerical information"' in a general purpose digital computer.' Spe-
cifically, the process involved the conversion of binary coded decimal
(BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals.' Various ways of per-
forming this conversion had existed prior to the applicants' discovery
of their method, which they alleged to be better and simpler in opera-
lion! Their method consisted of programming' a general purpose dig-
ital computer—a machine already long in use—with an appropriate
algorithm .° However, the same process could also be performed men-
1 — U.S. —, 93 S. Ct. 253 (1972).
2 Application No. 315,050. The facts in this paragraph appear in Application of Ben-
son, 441 F.2d 682, 682-84 (C.C.P.A. 1971), and Gottschalk v. Benson, 93 S. Ct. at 253-55.
8 The specification is that element of the patent application that discloses the com-
ponents of the invention. This disclosure must be so clear and concise as to permit a
person skilled in the art to which the invention pertains to make and use the invention.
35 U.S.C. 112 ( 19 70).
4 93 S. Ct. at 254,
5 A computer is a "device capable of solving problems by accepting data, performing
prescribed operations on the data, and supplying the results of these operations." Com-
puters and the Law 124 (P. Bigelow ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Bigelow]. A computer
may be either digital—a "computer that operates on discrete data by performing arith-
metic and logic processes on these data," id. at 125—or analog—a "computer that oper-
ates on analog data by performing physical processes on these data," id. at 121. Digital
computers can be further classified as special purpose computers, which are designed to
solve a restricted class of problems, id. at 134, and general purpose computers, which are
designed to solve a wide class of problems, id. at 127.
The human mind deals with quantitative information in various numerical forms,
such as the decimal form (0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9). However, before a computer is able to
process this same quantitative information, it must be converted into pure binary form, a
system of representation having only two basic elements, usually indicated by "0" and
"1." 441 F.2d at 682-83. This conversion has an intermediate step, which is the BCD, a
"decimal notation in which the individual decimal digits are each represented by a group
of binary digits .. .." Bigelow, supra note 5, at 122. Thus, the number "23" would appear
in BCD form as "0010 0011," whereas after final conversion into pure binary form, the
same number would be represented as "10111."
7 441 F.2d at 683. The applicants specified various advantages, such as reducing the
number of steps required to be taken, disposing with the repetitive storing and retrieval
of partially converted information, eliminating the need for equipment changes and the
use of auxiliary equipment, and decreasing the chance of error.
8 A program is a plan for solving a problem. Bigelow, supra note 5, at 132. A com-
puter contains circuitry which will permit instructions to be programmed into its system.
Such programs usually contain arithmetic functions, as well as instructions to store re-
sults, read and record data input, write an output, and compare data. The computer
performs these operations in sequence according to the user's program, Furth & Hoffman,
Introduction to Machine Methods, in Bigelow, supra note 5, at 28.
9 An algorithm is a "prescribed set of well defined rules or processes for the solution
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tally through use of a proper conversion table compiled manually with
pencil and paper. All that the applicants' method actually did was vary
the arithmetic steps a human would normally use by changing the
order of the steps, by changing some, of the symbolism, and by taking
subtotals after each successive operation.° The claims in the applica-
tion were not limited to any particular form of technology, apparatus,
or end use and thus did not purport to encompass use of the claimed
method in any particular mechanism."
The Patent Office rejected claims 8 and 13 of the application,'
and in 1968 the Patent Office Board of Appeals (Board) affirmed.°
The Board found these claims to set forth "mental processes' which
of a problem in a finite number of steps . . ..." Iligelow, supra note 5, at 121. In con-
trast, a heuristic approach uses "exploratory methods of problem solving in which solu-
tions are described by evaluation of the progress made toward the final result." Id. at 127.
10 93 S. Ct. at 255.
11
 Id, at 254.
12 441 F.2d at 682. These were the only claims actually considered by the Patent
Office. Apparently the other claims had met with a preliminary rejection by the Patent
Office. Claim 8 reads:
The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into binary
which comprises the steps of—
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a re-entrant shift register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there is a
binary "1" in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary "1" in said position of second register,
(4) adding a binary "I." to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a "1" to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by a least three positions in preparation
for a succeeding binary "1" in the second position of said register.
Claim 13 reads:
A data processing method for converting binary coded decimal number repre-
sentations into binary number representations comprising the steps of—
(1) testing each binary digit position i, beginning with the least significant
binary digit position, of the most significant decimal digit representation for a
binary "0" or a binary "1";
(2) if a binary "0" is detected, repeating step (1) for the next least signifi-
cant binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(3) if a binary "1" is detected, adding a binary "1" at the (i-1-1)th and
(i+3)th least significant binary digit positions of the next lesser significant deci-
mal digit representation, and repeating step (1) for the next least significant
binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(4) upon exhausting the binary digit positions of said most significant deci-
mal digit representation, repeating steps , (1) through (3) for the next lesser
significant decimal digit representation as modified by the previous execution of
steps (1) through (3); and
(5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least significant decimal
digit representation has been so processed.
12 441 F.2d at 682.
14 A mental process has been viewed as "a series of unique but undefined steps
executed by the biological apparatus known as the human brain." Sutton, The "Mental
Steps" Doctrine: A Critical Analysis in the Light of Prater and Wei, 52 J, Pat, Off. Soc'y
479, 481 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sutton].
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did not conform to the statutory prerequisites for patentability as de-
fined in the Patent Act."
The Court of Customs and Patents Appeals (CCPA) reversed this
rejection by the Board." The CCPA refused to consider an eleventh-
hour attempt by the Board to lend support to its original rejection of
the method as a mental process with the added argument that the
claims were insufficiently distinct," fearing that such consideration
would obscure the major issue as to whether a computer program con-
stitutes a patentable process." Purporting to determine the patent-
ability of the process solely on the basis of section 101, the CCPA con-
cluded that the proposed method involved only a machine-implemented
process which did not require human intervention." The CCPA rea-
soned that although the same process could be performed mentally,
there were no "mental steps" such as the exercise of judgment or
decision-making required in the proposed method, 2° while the only
practical and technologically productive use of the process would be a
non-mental use in a computer. 21 Hence the Board's "mental process"
characterization was inaccurate.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari sub
nom. Gottschalk v. Benson. 22
 In 1972, the Court unanimously reversed
the CCPA and HELD: an idea—in this case a mathematical formula
15 35 U.S.C. § 100(b), 101 (1970). These sections will be referred to in the text
as section 100(b) and section 101 respectively. Section 100(b) provides:
The term "process" means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.
Section 101 provides:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
18
 Application of Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
17
 Id. at 684-85. The statutory scope of a claim is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970).
This section will be referred to in the text as section 112. Section 112 provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly point-
ing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention. A claim may be written in independent or dependent form, and
if in independent form, it shall be construed to include all the limitations of the
claim incorporated by reference into the dependent claim.
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material,
or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corre-
sponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof.
19
 441 F.2d at 684-85. A patentable process must be new and useful, novel, and non-
obvious. 35 U.S.C. it 101-03 (1970).
19
 441 F.2d at 687.
20
 Id. at 688.
21 Id.
22 405 U.S. 915 ( 1972).
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which expresses a mental process—is unpatentable. A computer pro-
gram devised from the formula is likewise unpatentable, since the
formula has no practical use except in connection with a program for
a digital computer, and the patent would therefore wholly preempt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the
formula itself." The Court exhibited a reluctance to formulate any new
rules for measuring the patentability of a program, preferring instead
to leave this task to Congress." In order to avoid breaking any new
ground before Congress had taken action, the Court based its holding
on earlier Supreme Court opinions dealing with the patentability of
mechanical and chemical processes?5
The purpose of this note is to consider the propriety of the Su-
preme Court opinion. This task requires an initial examination of the
CCPA decision in Application of Benson as an extension of a series of
earlier CCPA decisions which had gradually eroded the mental steps
doctrine28 into oblivion. Thereafter, the note will turn to an analysis
of the Supreme Court's opinion in Gottschalk v. Benson. The Court's
use of earlier Supreme Court decisions to formulate its holding will be
examined. The note will also discuss the statutory basis for the decision.
Following an assessment of the various policy considerations behind
the Court's holding that a computer program is an unpatentable mental
process, such as the possible availability of other means of protecting
a program and the Court's deference to Congress for ultimate decision,
the note will conclude with a brief discussion of the effect of the Court's
holding on the future patentability of programs.
Prior CCPA Decisions
The CCPA's decision in Application of Benson followed a series
of recent cases in which the CCPA had attempted to formulate guide-
lines for determining the patentability of a program. By tracing the
judicial development of these guidelines, the rationale by which the
CCPA in Benson approved the patentability of a computer program
will be elucidated. Application of Prater21
 represents the initial attempt
23 93 S. Ct. at 257.
24 Id. at 258.
25
 Id. at 257.
20 As the term is used by the patent courts, a "mental step" is:
a step in a claimed process which may be performed by the human brain in
combination with such peripheral devices as eyes and hands, but which may also
be executed by a mechanical or electrical device. • • . [A] mental process may be
viewed as the unknown series of operations which the brain goes through when
actually performing a single mental step in a claimed process: Mental steps are
portions of process claims; mental processes take place in the human mind.
Sutton, supra note 14, at 482.
Under the mental steps doctrine, mental steps, even if novel, are not patentable. Rani-
burton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 146 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Application
of Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d .377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951) ; In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165,
167-68 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
27
 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). For commentary on Prater, see Sutton, supra
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by the CCPA to establish such standards. in this case of first impres-
sion, the court was asked to determine the patentability of method
and apparatus claims within the field of spectral analysis for selecting
optimum peaks and providing a particular subset of equations least
susceptible to error amplification. Whereas in prior decisions mechan-
ical and chemical process claims had been rejected as resting solely
on mental steps," the court in Prater found that "the teachings of the
specification provide a full disclosure of at least analog apparatus for
carrying out the claimed steps without requiring any steps to be per-
formed in the human mind." 3D Thus the court did not reject the claims
as covering an unpatentable mental process. In reaching this decision,
the court removed the underpinnings of the "mental steps" doctrine
when it firmly rejected a "rule" which had grown out of dictum in
Cochrane v. Deener" to the effect that, in order to be patentable, all
processes must operate physically upon some substance." However,
even though the applicants had disclosed a machine-implemented"
process, the process in Prater was still held to be unpatentable because
the specification did not expressly and distinctly set out the subject
matter of the invention as required by section 11289 The court thus
concluded that the method claim, even when read in light of the specifi-
cation, was broad enough "to encompass pencil and paper markings
which a mathematician might make in documenting or recording his
mental calculations." 84 •
Three months later, when asked to review the Board's rejection
of method and apparatus claims which consisted of programming a
set of equations into a digital computer with the result of depicting
three-dimensional objects as two-dimensional drawings, the CCPA in
Application of Bernhart attempted to extend its conclusion in Prater
that "disclosure of apparatus for performing the process wholly without
human intervention merely shows that the disclosed process does not
fall within the so-called 'mental steps' exclusion!'" The court in Prater
had held that because the disputed claims in that case disclosed only a
mental process, they were overly-broad in terms of section 112; in con-
trast, the court in Bernhart concluded that claims covering only mental
note 14, at 479, and Woodcock, Mental Steps and Computer Programs, 52 J. Pat. Off,
Soc'y 275 (1970).
28 Application of Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Abrams,
188 F.2d 165, 168 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
29 415 F.2d at 1402.
80 94 U.S. (IV Otto) 780, 788 (1876).
81 415 F.2d at 1402-03. For further discussion of this dictum in Cochrane, see text
at notes 106-10 infra.
82 A machine-implemented process is a process which may be implemented solely
by mechanical means with no need for human intervention. Thus, a machine-implemented
process may be patentable, provided that the method claim clearly discloses a machine
capable of performing a process and that the process itself meets the statutory prerequi-
sites for patentability. Id. at 1403.
83 Id. at 1405.
34 Id.
85 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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steps were not too broad to conform to the statutory prerequisites for
distinctness of the disclosure in a claim a 0 However, instead of discuss-
ing the claims solely in terms of section 112, the court cited section 101,
which defines what constitutes a statutory process." Notwithstanding
the court's determination that the claim disclosed a machine-imple-
mented process, the court nevertheless refused to patent the process
because it was "obvious' in relation to prior art. Thus, while attempt-
ing to refine the Prater guidelines for defining a statutory claim, the
CCPA clouded the issues by failing to distinguish between the pur-
poses of section 101 in defining a statutory process and those of section
112 in defining a statutory claim.
Shortly after Bernhart, the CCPA reversed a decision by the
Board in Application of Mahony," which had rejected an application
for a patent on a synchronization process for framing a number of bits"
flowing in a bit stream" into digital words." The court saw the sole
issue to be one of interpreting the claims under section 112 and did not
consider the patentability of the process under section 101. The court
rejected an argument by the Board that the disputed claim failed to
conform to section 112 by setting out an unpatentable process. It ap-
pears that the court correctly perceived that to treat the question of
the statutory nature of the process, which is analyzed under section 101,
as an element in the determination of whether a claim is statutory under
Be Id. at 1400-01.
87 The phrases "statutory process" and "statutory claim" serve as short-hand ex-
pressions for a process which conforms to the prerequisites for patentability of section
101 and for a claim which satisfies the standards for breadth and distinctness set out by
section 112.
88 Id. at 1401. The court stressed that this was a machine-implemented process with
no mental steps and stated that "Et]o find that the claimed process could be done
mentally would require us to hold that a human mind is a digital computer or its
equivalent, and that a draftsman is a planar plotting apparatus or its equivalent." Id.
88 The standard for obviousness is set out in 35 U.S.C. * 103 (1970):
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the inven-
tion was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which
the invention was made.
For a discussion of the standards employed in determining the prerequisites to
non-obviousness, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12-19 (1966), and United
States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 48-52 (1966).
40 421 F.2d 742 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
41 Bit is the abbreviation for binary digit, which is a "character used to represent
one of the two digits in the numeration system having the radix 2." Bigelow, supra
note 5, at 122.
42 Bit stream is defined in Mahony as a term used "in conjunction with transmission
methods in which character separation is accomplished by the terminal equipment, and
the bits are transmitted over the circuit in a consecutive line of bits." 421 F.2d at 746.
48 A digital or computer word is a "sequence of bits or characters treated as a unit
and capable of being stored in one computer location." Bigelow, supra note 5, at 124.
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section 112 would unnecessarily complicate the law." The two statutes
represent distinct steps in the determination of the patentability of a
process. Section 112 is used to examine the distinctness and breadth of
the claim. Once it has been established that the claim discloses the
process with sufficient clarity, then it is determined whether the process
complies with section 101 by being new and useful in relation to prior
art. Accordingly, the court determined whether the distinctness of the
disclosure in the disputed claim complied with section 112. However,
instead of merely concluding—as it had in Prater—that the claims
were indistinct, the court developed a rule of construction which re-
quired that a statutory claim need cover only what the applicant reason-
ably regarded as his invention." Employing this subjective standard
of reasonableness, the court concluded that the claim was statutory
since, although there was no express reference to a machine-imple-
mented process, the terms "bit" and "bit stream" connoted electrical
signals, thereby precluding a reading of the claim as encompassing a
mental process." Thus the court clarified the guidelines for determin-
ing the distinctness of a claim under section 112 by adopting a rule of
construction employing a subjective standard of reasonableness.
Following Mahony, the CCPA reversed another decision by the
Board in Application of Musgrave," which refused to issue a patent on
a method for obtaining more accurate recordings of seismograms. The
court rejected the Board's reliance on the dictum in Cochrane's from
which subsequent cases had derived a rule that a statutory process
must operate physically upon a substance.49
 In addition, the court criti-
cized three rules proposed by counsel for the inventor in In re Abrams"
as being unsound; accordingly it did not feel bound to follow them as
precedent." The Musgrave court found rules 2 and 3 to be irrelevant
to a determination of whether a process complies with section 101,
44 421 F.2d at 745.
45
 Id. This rule of construction proposed by the CCPA presents certain difficulties
of proof. In meeting this subjective standard, an inventor will have to consider care-
fully the possible obstacles which he might face in proving what he reasonably regarded
as his invention. For example, should the Patent Office merely attempt to glean the
intent of the inventor from his application, or should the Office require the Sling of a
sworn affidavit in addition to the application? Furthermore, should the CCPA establish
a rebuttable or conclusive presumption of reasonableness which would operate to decide
doubtful cases in favor of the applicant, and should such a presumption shift the burden
of proof to the Patent Office? The resolution of such questions by the CCPA could have
insured greater efficacy for its rule of construction.
40
 Id. at 747.
47 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
48 For a discussion of this dictum, see text at notes 106-10 infra.
49 431 F.2d at 893.
50 jgg F.2d 165, 166 (C.C.PA. 1951). The proposed rules were (1) if all steps are
purely mental, the claim is nonstatutory and unpatentable; (2) if the steps are both
physical and mental but the novelty and advancement of the art lie solely in the mental
steps, the claim is unpatentable; and (3) if the steps are both physical and mental, and
the novelty and advancement of the art lie in the physical steps while the mental steps
are merely incidental to the process, the claim is patentable. Id.
51 431 F.2d at 889.
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since novelty and advancement of the art are not prerequisites under
section 101. In considering rule l's rejection of "purely mental" pro-
cesses, the court concluded that this rule could be applicable if "purely
mental" were construed to mean only steps which were incapable of
being performed by machine, and not merely a machine-implemented
process which may also be performed mentally.'" Having thus deter-
mined that a process was not always nonstatutory merely because some
or all of the steps therein could be carried out by the human mind as
well as by disclosed apparatus, the CCPA was free to formulate its own
standards for defining a statutory process: "All that is necessary .. .
to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory 'process' within 35
U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in conso-
nance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of 'use-
ful arts.'"" As a result of Musgrave, the criteria for judging the patent-
ability of a process under section 101 and the breadth and distinctness
of a claim under section 112 became more clearly delineated.
In deciding Application of Benson, the CCPA related it to these
prior cases, observing that all of them arose as a result of the Patent
Office's use of the mental steps doctrine" to reject the processes in-
volved as encompassing nonstatutory subject matter." However, unlike
the earlier decisions, each of which involved some combination of
method and apparatus claims, Benson treated only method claims for
a computer program.°° In holding that the disputed claims set out a
statutory process, the CCPA stated that section 101 was the sole basis
of its decision," and in support of this position cited the caveat in
Mahony against combining the question of the statutory nature of the
process with a determination of the breadth of the claim." However, it
is submitted that the CCPA merely paid lip service to this warning.
The court then went on to devote the major part of its opinion to an
application of the Mahony rule of construction to the disputed claims,"
and then utilized this rationale in reaching its conclusion about the pa-
tentability of the process.°° Moreover, the court not only confused the
issues in the case by adopting a standard of reasonableness in con-
struing a claim to determine the statutory nature of a process; it also
compounded this confusion by employing the wrong standard of rea-
sonableness. Instead of citing the subjective standard of reasonableness
52 Id.
55 Id. at 893. The clarity of these standards is illustrated by Application of Foster,
438 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (C.C.P.A. 1971), where a method for removing distortion from
a seismogram was found to conform to section 101 because it promoted technological
arts but not to conform to section 112 because the claim could not be interpreted to
cover only what the applicant reasonably intended to be his invention.
64 The "mental steps" doctrine is explained in note 26 supra.
50 441 F.2d at 686.
65 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
55 Id. at 687.
00 Id. at 687-88.
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set out in Mahony, the CCPA relied on the concurring opinion in Mus-
grave, which incorrectly stated the Mahony standard in objective terms
—that the disclosure in the claim must be reasonable "to one of ordi-
nary skill in the pertinent art when read in light of and consistently
with the specification"—'in contrast to the more subjective language
of the court in Mahony: "The proper consideration here is whether
the appealed claims cover only what the appellant [the applicant]
regards as his invention."' It would appear that the Mahony majority's
rule of construction conforms to the language of section 112, by requir-
ing that the claims should make a disclosure "particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention."° Although section 112 also expressly creates an
objective standard which requires the specification to describe the pro-
cess in such "exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains . . . to make and use the same,"" the objective stan-
dard does not refer to the language of the claims. Moreover, even in
reference to the specification, section 112 requires that it "shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention."05
 Thus, even if the CCPA had chosen to amend its rule of
construction, it might have done so more effectively by making express
reference to the language of the Mahony standard of reasonableness
rather than to the incorrect restatement of that Mahony standard in the
Musgrave concurring opinion.
In construing the reasonableness of the disclosure in the claims in
Benson, the CCPA followed the Mahony court's analysis of "bits" and
"bit streams" in arguing that a reference to "shifting" and "signals" in
claim 8" sufficiently demonstrated a machine-implemented process
performed with no human intervention once the computer had been ini-
tially programmed.° However, the court in Benson then employed the
Mahony rule to find that claim 13" also disclosed a machine-imple-
mented process, even though the claim did not contain any mechanical
or electrical terminology 0°
Having employed the objective standard of reasonableness to find
sufficient disclosure in the disputed claims to satisfy the section 112
requirements, the CCPA next used the same standard to find a statu-
tory mental process within the scope of section 101:
Apparatus, machinery, "hardware"—whatever it may be
called—is disclosed by which the steps can be carried out
without human intervention but at the same time, since the
01 Id., citing 431 F.2d at 895 n.1 (concurring opinion).
62 421 F.2d at 745.
00 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970) (emphasis added).
64
 Id.
65 Id. (emphasis added).
06 The text of claim 8 is set out in note 12 supra.
07 441 F.2d at 687.
68 The text of claim 13 is set out in note 12 supra.
69 441 F.2d at 687-88.
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claim does not itself call for any particular hardware, the
method within the claim can be practiced either with appa-
ratus other than that described or with the simplest of equip-
ment This could in theory be any kind of writing imple-
ment and any kind of recording medium—"pencil and paper"
—or even, we suppose, red and blue poker chips and a surface
to put them, on or slots to put them in so that "0"s and "1"s
can be represented."
It is submitted that this argument misses the point. It is unreasonable
to construe the disclosure in a claim to be adequate because it contains
language sufficiently narrow to indicate an intent to implement the
process by machine, and at the same time to find that the process set
out in the claim is statutory even though the language in the claim is
indistinct in failing to disclose any particular apparatus.
It is only in the closing paragraphs of the opinion that the CCPA
finally responded to the Board's rejection of the process as being purely
mental and hence nonstatutory under section 101. The court found
none of the steps to be purely mental," since neither the exercise of
judgment nor the making of a decision between alternatives was re-
quired even in the manual performance of this method." More impor-
tantly, the court observed that the only practical use of this process
would be to increase the speed and utility of computer operations.
Accordingly, even a process having no practical use other than to en-
hance the internal operation of machines which concededly promote
technological progress would likewise advance the technological arts.
Thus, after initially confusing the issue as to whether a process is
statutory by employing the reasonableness standard for a statutory
claim, the CCPA ultimately resolved the issue by determining that the
process would promote the technological arts."
The above survey of recent CCPA cases illustrates an attempt by
the court to abandon the mental steps doctrine and to replace it with
new guidelines for determining the statutory nature of a process under
section 101 and of a claim under section 112. However, although the
70 Id. at 688.
71 Application of Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1402 n.22 (C.C.P.A. 1969), The CCPA has
attempted to distinguish between mental and physical steps:
"Purely mental steps" are considered to be steps which may only be performed
in, or with the aid of, the human mind. This is quite in contrast to "purely
physical steps" which may only be performed by physical means, machinery,
or apparatus. . . . Between the purely mental and purely physical ends of the
spectrum there lies an infinite variety of steps that may be either machine-
implemented or performed in, or with the aid of, the human mind.
Id.
72 441 F.2d at 688.
73 In two cases decided by the CCPA after Benson, the court held a mental process
to be patentable because it met the statutory' requirement under section 101 of being
within the class of technological or useful arts. In re Waldbaum, 173 U.S.P.Q. 430, 434,
No. 8619 (C.C.P.A., Apr. 20, 1972), and Application of Mcllroy, 442 F.2d 1397, 1398
(C.C.P.A. 1971).
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CCPA had delineated the rules in Mahony and Musgrave, the court in
Benson was careless in its use of those standards. Since both section
101 and section 112 establish definite and distinct prerequisites for the
determination of the patentability of a process, it was not improper for
the CCPA to consider both sections in determining patentability. How-
ever, the court should have taken greater care to define each step in
this determination in terms of its statutory basis and to relate its guide-
lines to the proper purpose of each statute. The confusion between the
purposes of sections 101 and 112 which the court generated served
merely to hinder any attempt to replace the mental steps doctrine with
a worthier successor.
The Supreme Court Decision
In turning to an analysis of the Supreme Court decision in Gott-
schalk v. Benson, it should first be noted that the Court's failure to
mention the CCPA cases further illustrates their questionable status.
Instead, the Court relied on earlier Supreme Court decisions involving
mechanical or chemical processes to answer the question of "whether
the method described and claimed is a 'process' within the meaning of"
section 100(b) and section 101. 74
 In determining the limits of a statu-
tory process, the Court cited Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard for the
proposition that an idea itself is not patentable." However, if the idea
could somehow be made practically useful in a new device, then the new
device would be patentable." In Howard, although the inventor had a
good idea for attaching an eraser to a pencil in order to increase the
eraser's utility, his reliance on the elastic qualities of rubber to achieve
this attachment, although useful, did not constitute a new device, since
the elasticity of rubber is common knowledge. In short, the Court in
Gottschalk looked to a case holding that only a new and useful device
which embodies a mechanical process is patentable.
The Gottschalk Court then referred to another early decision,
LeRoy v. Tatham," to distinguish further between a natural power or
principle and the process used to exploit the power by applying it to a
useful object. The Court there had held that only a mechanical process
—and not the idea which gave rise to it—would be patentable: a funda-
mental idea or truth may be sufficiently broad to be a motivating force
in the invention of various processes, each patentable in its own right,
but the idea is not itself patentable." The Court in LeRoy had at-
tempted to establish the full boundaries of a patentable process, holding
that not only must a process set out more than an abstract principle, but
that it must also refrain from encompassing the results of the process."
74 93 S. Ct. at 254.
75 Id. at 255, citing 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874).
76 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507.
77 55 U.S. 167, 14 How. 156 (1852).
79 Id. at 187, 14 How. at 175.
79 Id. at 187-88, 14 How, at 175.
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The latter is unpatentable; to patent a result would prohibit other
persons from achieving the same result by a different means."
The Court in Gottschalk also mentioned a more recent Supreme
Court decision involving mathematical expressions of scientific truths,
MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America," which
reaffirmed these earlier standards for the patentability of a process. In
addition to reemphasizing the distinctions made in these early decisions
between a mechanical process and the idea giving rise to it, MacKay
had further to distinguish both from a process and from an idea a
mathematical formula which defined the idea and which thereby per-
mitted an inventor to utilize this idea in a particular process. Although
not purely an idea, a formula, being merely the expression of an idea,
nevertheless lacked the concreteness necessary to qualify as a useful
device created with the aid of an idea."
The Court in MacKay also considered the scope of the disclosure
in the disputed claims. In an infringement suit where the defendant al-
leged the invalidity of the patent, the Court found the new and useful
device to be patentable in that'it was 'narrowly disclosed and consisted
of a structure conforming to the teachings of the formula." It was only
when the inventor sought to discard the mathematical precision af-
forded by this formula in order to establish that the defendant's activ-
ities constituted an infringement of his claim that the Court objected
to the process as encompassing areas to which the formula did not
apply. The Court in Gottschalk properly avoided this aspect of
MacKay, since such questions, regarding the scope of a claim, would
involve section 112.
Thus the Court in Gottschalk extracted from these earlier deci-
sions a rule that only a process is patentable, not the idea which gave
rise to it or the results of its use. The corollary of that rule is that, in
order to be patented, a process must be incorporated in a new and
useful device created with the aid of an idea. In assessing the propriety
of this corollary rule, it is important to note that alI of these cases,
treating only mechanical processes, were decided prior to the advent of
computer technology and therefore did not consider any of the circum-
stances peculiar to this field, such as the value of a computer program
as a process regardless of any relation it may have to a mechanical
computer device. The Gottschalk opinion, then, leaves some problems
unexplored. Aside from the question of the propriety of using pre-
computer case law to determine the statutory nature of a computer
program, there is also a question as to whether the Court should have
made more detailed and frequent reference to section 100 (b) and sec-
8° Id. For a discussion of the other cases cited by the Court with regard to the
delineation of this means-result restriction on patentability in the form of the "function
of the apparatus" doctrine, see text at notes 98-105 infra.
81 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
82 Id. at 94.
83 Id.
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tion 101 than quoting them in a single footnote." In addition,' since
the case law cited by the Court had developed prior to the 1953 revision
of the Patent Act which produced section 100(b) and section 101, per-
haps the Court should have discussed the difference between the old and
new statutory provisions as well as any effect this could have had on
the authority of these pre-1953 cases. For example, the old Ace' used
the term "art," nowhere mentioning "process" as presently defined by
section 100(b), and perhaps this more explicit language would have
elicited a response different from that made by the Court in the earlier
decisions. In these pre-1953 cases the Court was concerned with
whether the term "art" could be construed as incorporating a process
before it could begin to apply the statutory prerequisites for patent-
ability to a process. Rather than seeking to define a process, the
Gottschalk Court could have used the definition of a process provided
by Congress in section 100(b) as a starting point and then focused its
attention mainly on determining whether a process conforms to section
101. In sum, reference to these technicalities could have provided
added strength to the Court's opinion; it is not suggested, however,
that failure to make such references negated the validity of the Court's
discussion of what constitutes a statutory process.
Although the Court initially limited the scope of its opinion to the
single issue of whether or not a computer program is a statutory process
under section 101, it weakened the statutory basis for its decision by
observing that the "claims were not limited to any particular art or
technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any partic-
ular end use,"" and that "the 'process' claim is so abstract and sweep-
ing as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure-
binary conversion." 87 By challenging the scope of the claim, the Court
appeared to be shifting to a section 112 analysis of the disputed claims.
After this shift in emphasis, the Court cited O'Reilly v. Morse," which
held that a claim for a process of using electro-magnetism to produce
distinguishable written signs for telegraphy could not include every
use of electro-magnetism, since, if this claim were approved, it would
not matter by what process the result was accomplished." The language
of Morse illustrates the Court's concern over the scope of the disputed
claim: "[The applicant] does not confine his claim to the machinery or
parts of machinery, which he specifies; but claims for himself a monop-
oly in its use, however developed, for the purpose of printing at a dis-
tance. * * * [T] he claim is too broad . . . ."" Thus, the citation of
Morse only emphasized the Court's digression from its original con-
cern over the statutory nature of the process under section 101.
84 93 S. Ct. at 254 n.2.
8S 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1946).
se 93 s. Ct, at 254.
87 Id. at 255.
BB 56 U.S. 65, 15 How. 62 (1853).
89 Id. at 119, 15 How. at 113.
90 Id. at 120, 15 How, at 113.
1062
CASE NOTES
However, the Court subsequently explained its reference to Morse
by quoting an interpretation of that case which had appeared in The
Telephone Cases:" "The effect of that decision was, therefore, that
the use of magnetism as a motive power, without regard to the partic-
ular process with which it was connected in the patent, could not be
claimed, but its use in that connection could." 92 Thus the Court in The
Telephone Cases referred to Morse in support of the proposition that
although the idea behind the process is unpatentable, its use in a partic-
ular useful process would be patentable."
Although the Court in Gottschalk chose to limit its decision to the
issue of the statutory nature of the process under section 101, the Court
unquestionably departed from this route when it considered the statu-
tory nature of the disputed claim. Even when the Court cited The
Telephone Cases in explanation of its reliance on Morse, it quoted
portions of the decision which, like Morse, also considered the breadth
of the disputed claim." The Court in Gottschalk thereby departed even
further from its original consideration of the statutory nature of a pro-
cess when it cited these portions of the case to illustrate that the dis-
puted claim did not apply to all telephonic use of electricity." It is sub-
mitted that both of these areas of analysis—concerning the nature of a
statutory claim and a statutory process—should be included in a deter-
mination of the patentability of a program, since proper disclosure in a
claim provides a basis for making this determination, provided, how-
ever, that these analyses are clearly delineated. Adequate consideration
of the question of patentability should require an analysis of both the
process and the claim." It is therefore suggested that if the Court
intended to discuss the breadth of the disputed claims, it could have
clarified its treatment of this issue by relating these considerations to
section 112, since a claim of proper breadth merely serves as a frame-
work in which to consider the patentability and does not automatically
render the disclosed process patentable.
Following its discussion of the scope of the disputed claim, the
Court reviewed a series of prior Supreme Court decisions which "argued
that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or
apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a 'different
91 126 U.S. 1 (1887).
92 Id. at 534.
93 Id. at 533.
04 Id. at 538. Compare this with the language of section 112, which is set out in
note 17 supra.
95 93 S. Ct. at 256.
95 In considering the patentability of the process in Morse, the Court expressly
considered both elements of statutory patentability:
Whoever discovers that a certain useful result will be produced, in any art,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, by the use of certain means, is
entitled to a patent for it; provided he specifies the means he uses in a manner
so full and exact, that any one skilled in the science to which it appertains, can,
by using the means he specifies . . . produce precisely the result he describes.
56 U.S. at 126, 15 How. at 119.
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state or thing.' "" However, by failing to state whether it regarded
these cases as espousing sound rules for defining the patentability of a
process, or whether the cases presented distinguishable proposals, the
Court was unclear as to how much weight it wished to give these cases
in formulating its holding. One case so cited was Corning v. Burden,"
which modified the view that only a new and useful device based on a
process—not the process itself—was patentable by holding that a pro-
cess itself is patentable where the result is produced by chemical action
or by the operation of some power of nature or some substance upon
another object." Moreover, the Court in Corning reiterated the
"means-result" doctrine, by which a patentable process was required
to represent a practical means of producing a beneficial result and not
merely the result itself 100 By thus distinguishing between a process as
a method of actively operating upon an object and a process as describ-
ing the effect of the operation as it is passively received by the object,
the Court in Corning acknowledged the "function of the apparatus"
rule which provides that the "function of a machine, or the effect pro-
duced by it on the material subjected to the action of the machine"'
is unpatentable. 102
To provide further examples of the argument that a patentable
process need not be tied to a particular device as long as it changes the
state of an object, the Court in Gottschalk cited Waxham v. Smith.'"
Waxham held a process for improved incubation of eggs to be patent-
able, regardless of the particular form of mechanism used to put the
process into operation.'" As in Corning, the Court in Waxham treated
the issue of patentability in terms of the "function of the apparatus"
doctrine, distinguishing between the unpatentable function which a
machine performs and the patentable means by which the performance
is secured.'" Thus, assuming that the "function of the apparatus" doc-
trine may correctly be applied to a process and used to prohibit the
patenting of the result of a process, it is submitted that Corning and
Waxham further defined the boundaries of a process so as to exclude the
results of a process from patentability.
To further elucidate its treatment of Corning and Waxham, the
97 93 S. Ct. at 257 (emphasis added).
98 56 U.S. 267, 15 How. 252 (1853).
99 Id. at 283, 15 How. at 267.
100 Id. at 284, 15 How, at 268. For a further discussion of this principle, see text
at notes 79-80 supra.
101
 Id. This "function of the apparatus" rule was abandoned by the CCPA as a
heretical offshoot of the "means-result" rule in Application of Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d
856, 864 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
102 56 U.S. at 284, 15 How. at 268.
108 294 U.S. 20 (1935).
104 Id. at 22.
los Id. The Court also died Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935), which does not appear
to be in point. Smith was concerned primarily with the scope of the claim, not the
patentability of the process which is either tied to a particular machine or changes an
object from one form to another. Id. at 11.
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Gottschalk Court cited Cochrane v. Deener, which held that a process
for increasing the quality of flour was patentable regardless of the par-
ticular instrumentality used to implement it.'" Of course, even though
the tools used to perform the process were of secondary importance,
the Court still required for a finding of patentability, that certain things
should be done to the flour in a certain order.'" At this point it should
be recalled that the CCPA position on Cochrane differs from that of the
Gottschalk Court. The CCPA has criticized the Cochrane "rule"—that
a patentable process must operate physically upon substances—as mere
dictum from a decision which was originally intended not to restrict
the patentability of a process but to remove any limitations that would
tie a process to the means used in performing it.'° 8 Of course, instead of
criticizing the weight afforded to this dictum, the CCPA could have
dismissed Cochrane entirely as a pre-computer case capable of discuss-
ing a process only in concrete terms pertaining to doing certain things
to certain substances. However, even if the Cochrane limitation were
dictum, the Supreme Court had stressed similar restrictions in other
cases, for example, in O'Reilly v. Morse, where the Court defined a
patentable process in concrete terms as being confined to the apparatus
specified by the applicant."° In any case, the Court in Gottschalk did
not appear to give much weight to Cochrane. It is suggested, then, that
the Court utilized this restriction on the patentability of a process as
an argument and not as the basis of its holding."°
Thus, the Court in Gottschalk embellished its earlier discussion of
the unpatentability of both the idea giving rise to a process and of the
result of a process by arguing that a patentable process must either
be tied to a machine or transform an object from one state to another.
Assuming that the Court did not cite Cochrane in support of its hold-
ing, it matters little that the Cochrane "rule" has undergone recent
relating to the patentability of a process that the Court in Gottschalk
deal with the "function of the apparatus" doctrine, which has met with
similar rebuke. This section of the opinion might therefore be best
described as an historical survey of prior attempts by the Court to de-
limit the scope of a patentable process.
It was after this examination of prior Supreme Court decisions
relating to the patentability of a process that the Court in Gottschalk
submitted its holding. The Court returned to its original premise that
100 94 U.S. (IV Otto) 780, 787 (1876).
107 id. at 788.
108 Application of Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1403 (C.C.PA. 1969).
109 56 U.S. at 120, 15 How, at 113. Similarly in Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. (XII
Otto) 707 (1880), where the Court issued a patent for a process of separating fat acids
and glycerine from fatty bodies and where there was no disclosure of a mechanical means
of implementation, a clue to the patentability was the reduction of an article to a differ-
ent state or thing. Id. at 721-22. See also Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366,
385-86 (1909), where the Court sustained a patent on a process involving mechanical
operations and producing a new and useful result.
110 93 S. Ct. at 257. See text at note 97 supra.
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an idea is not patentable,'" incorporating within the meaning of "idea"
the algorithm in the Benson claim used to convert BCD into pure
binary numerals.' The Court reasoned:
The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial
practical application except in connection with a digital com-
puter, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the
patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and
in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.'
At first glance, the Court's observation that the algorithm's only prac-
tical use is in a digital computer does not appear to support its holding.
The Court had previously presented the argument that a patentable
process had to be tied to a machine.'" By employing the same argument
as a ground for concluding that the computer process is unpatentable,
the Court generated confusion. Moreover, the Court's observation that
the process had only one practical use in a single type of machine seems
to conflict with the Court's earlier criticism of the broad scope of the
disputed claims." A good deal of this confusion may be eliminated by
assuming—as this paper does—that these arguments were not in sup-
port of the Court's holding and by reconsidering O'Reilly v. Morse,
not in the framework of the Court's concern over the claim, but in
light of the Court's refusal to issue a patent on electro-magnetism as an
idea."6
 If Morse had been able to patent an idea, even though he had
merely discovered how to use the idea in a single method, he would
have received protection against infringement both of his own method
and of any past or future methods of applying the same idea. This
would have preempted the use of the idea by everyone except Morse.
Similarly, assuming that the algorithm in the present case is an idea, it
is also unpatentable. Although Benson seeks only a single use of this
idea in a conversion process within a general purpose digital computer,
the idea has only a single practical use. As a result, he would in effect
be receiving protection against any other actual use of this same idea.
Thus, issuance of a patent for use of the idea in a single process would
have the same preemptive effect as issuance of the patent on the idea
itself would have had in Morse, since a patent of the only use of an
idea is no different from a patent on the idea itself.
To reiterate, by this failure to distinguish clearly the prior Su-
preme Court decisions which were the basis of its holding from those
earlier decisions which represented prior attempts by the Court to
define a patentable process, the Court in Gottschalk generated unneces-
sary confusion over the issue of what constitutes a patentable process.
As considered above, the holding of the CCPA in Benson also contained
For a case in support of this principle, see text at notes 77-78 supra.
112 0 S. Ct. at 257.
118 Id .
114 For a discussion of this principle, see text at note 97 supra.
115 For elucidation of this earlier criticism, see text at notes 86-93 supra.
116 56 U.S. at 65, 15 How. at 62.
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elements of uncertainty. The court there upheld the claims as contain-
ing disclosures reasonable under section 112, and then found the pro-
cess to be patentable under section 101, even though there was a lack
of disclosure of any particular apparatus for implementing the pro-
cess."' Assuming, of course, that the Supreme Court in Gottschalk
was correct in its initial premise that an idea is unpatentable, its holding
would appear to rest on firmer footing than the CCPA decision in
Benson, notwithstanding the uncertainty of the scope of a patentable
process as proposed by the Court.
Policy Considerations
In reaching its decision, the Court in Gottschalk adopted the ear-
lier Supreme Court rules as to the patentability of mechanical or
chemical processes and applied them to the patentability of a computer
program. The reluctance of the Court to formulate any new rules could
be explained by the intricacy of the policy considerations which con-
fronted the Court. The Report of the President's Commission on the
Patent System had advised that a computer program should be un-
patentable, "regardless of whether the program is claimed as: (a) an
article, (b) a process described in terms of the operations performed
by a machine pursuant to a program, or (c) one or more machine con-
figurations established by a program."" 8
 In reaching this conclusion,
the Report considered various policies which had a bearing on its
decision.
One reason for refusing to patent computer programs is the in-
ability of the Patent Office to examine these applications. The Report
noted that at present the Patent Office lacks a technique for the
classification of the various program applications, as well as the
search files needed to determine whether the program is preceded
by prior art.'" However, this need not be a permanent concern; it
could eventually be eliminated if the Patent Office began now to
formulate the necessary classification techniques and to compile ade-
quate search files.'" However, the Report also feared that the Patent
Office would be incapable of performing reliable searches due to the
tremendous volume of prior art being generated, and that these in-
adequate searches would seriously weaken the presumption of
validity"' which accompanies a patent.'" But the weight to be
117 For an analysis of the CCPA opinion in Benson, see text at notes 54-73 supra.
118 "To Promote the Progress of . . . Useful Arts" In an Age of Exploding Tech-
nology, Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System 12 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Report].
118
 Id. at 13. The statutory requirements for patentability are that the invention be
new and useful, novel, and non-obvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1970).
120
 For an argument along these lines, see Bender, Computer Programs: Should They
Be Patentable?, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 241, 250-51 (1968).
121 35	 § 282 (1970).
122 Report, supra note 118, at 13.
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afforded the statutory presumption of validity has been lessened."'
Moreover, the statutory prerequisites for patentability normally weed
out a vast number of specious applications before having to resort to
any lengthy search of prior art.' And if a computer could be pro-
grammed to search the growing files, the Patent Office would have
little difficulty in processing these program applications.'"
The Report was not concerned with the possibility of any detri-
mental effect which the denial of patentability might have on the
computer industry, observing "that the creation of programs has under-
gone substantial and satisfactory growth in the absence of patent
protection . . . ."12" Of course, this rapid development of computer
programs could have occurred in the first place as the result of
scientific researchers striving to advance the computer sciences."T
It is fair to argue that when industry became aware of the value of
computer programs, a profit motive replaced this scientific thirst for
knowledge as a prime motivating force behind further development
of computer programs. Industry thus favored patent protection—
accompanied by the promise of royalties—for its programs, so as to
make its investments in the development of new programs worthwhile.
Accordingly, there are those who fear that without patent protection
advancement in the computer industry will be retarded and that newly-
discovered programs will be hoarded by the developer.'"
However, a patent is not the sole means of protecting a computer
program. Copyright protection is currently available.'" Because this
protection is limited only to the copying of details, which can assume
many forms, and would not cover concepts or techniques used in the
program, copyright protection may be inadequate.'" Thus another
programmer would be free to use any uncopyrighted version of the
program. However, the practical effect of this protection may be
broadened by submitting to the Copyright Office a package containing
all conceivable versions of the program."' Moreover, there is more
similarity between patent and copyright protection than might first
appear, since the user of a pirated program cannot avoid copying the
program, even if his copying is limited to transferring the program
123 For example, see Lemelsan v. Topper Corp., 450 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1971).
121 Bender, supra note 120, at 252.
123 Sheers & Encke, Copyrights of Patents for Computer Programs?, 49 J. Pat. Off.
Soc'y 323, 327 (1967).
123 Report, supra note 118, at 13.
117 IBdender, supra note 120, at 246.
126 Report, supra note 118, at 13. Indeed, under certain conditions, the Copyright
Office will register a computer program in the same class as a book. 17 U.S.C. § 5(a)
(1970); 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(c), 202.4 (1972). Katona, Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 47 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 955, 958 (1965).
130 Jacobs, Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 47 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 6, 7
(1965).
131 Katona, supra note 129, at 969.
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into the storage center of his own computer."' Nevertheless, since
a copyright protects against only the copying of a program, the
inventor would still have no protection against a programmer who
developed the identical program independently of any knowledge of
the inventor's efforts.
A further obstacle to adequate protection under a copyright is the
fair use doctrine, which is a privilege in others than the owner of a
copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without the owner's consent; although technically an infringement,
such use is nevertheless allowed, provided that the public will benefit
from this appropriation and that it will not seriously impair the in-
centive to create.'" However, when "fair use" is claimed as a defense
in an infringement suit, the weight of this doctrine may be offset by
the doctrine of substantial similarity, by which the courts may find
infringement of a copyright even though the protected article has not
literally been copied. The latter doctrine is used on a case-by-case
basis to determine whether an ordinary observer would be led to
spontaneously believe that an article has been copied.'"
Moreover, assuming that neither patent nor copyright protection
is available to the developer of a computer program, he could still
protect the program under a trade secret agreement."' Under the
protective cloak of a trade secret agreement, the developer could
disclose his program to another party in return for the pledge of
secrecy and the payment of royalties. Of course, this agreement would
bind only the other party, and the developer would have no remedy
against a nonparty who had independently discovered and exploited
the same program.'" It is therefore conceded that a trade secret
agreement does not provide the same degree of protection as does
a patent.' However, as long as a developer enters into the agreement
with a reliable party, he will derive more benefit from doing so than
132
 Id. at 974.
133 Comment, Software Protection: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets, 35
Albany L. Rev. 695, 709 (1971).
134 Katona, supra note 129, at 970-71.
135
 Trade secret status exists when the subject matter is used continuously in one's
business, is not generally known or readily ascertainable by others and is treated with
due regard for protecting secrecy. Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b at 5-6 (1939);
12 R. Milgrim, Business Organizations: Trade Secrets §§ 2.01-2,09 (1973); Marmorck,
The Inventor's Common-Law Rights Today, 50 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 369, 375-81 (1968).
The courts generally view trade secrets as property. New Method Laundry Co. v.
MacCann, 174 Cal. 26, 31, 161 P. 990, 991 (1916). The value of the trade secret depends
substantially upon the secrecy with which it is maintained. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961). In the absence of secrecy, the
individual's property right disappears. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir.
1953). The major disadvantage to the owner of trade secret protection is that a com-
petitor may gain possession of the trade secret through independent analysis of the
components of the product. Id. at 375.
180 Restatement of Torts § 757, at 13-14 (1939).
137 Sheers Sr Encke, Copyrights of Patents for Computer Programs?, 49 J. Pat.
Off. Soc'y 323, 326-27, (1967).
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he would acquire from merely hoarding the program. Moreover, if
the program were capable of being independently discovered with
little difficulty, it is questionable whether such a program would be
patentable under the statutory prerequisite of nonobviousness.
Clearly, these various policy considerations are of major concern
in determining the patentability of a computer program. These con-
siderations represent the views of various interest groups, and, al-
though the Court was fortunate in receiving sixteen amicus curiae
briefs from such groups,'" the judicial process nevertheless lacks the
broad investigative powers of the legislature. Thus, in view of the
apparent complexity of the above considerations and the confusion
which arose from the CCPA's attempt to define a patentable process
under the existing statutes, the Court appears justified in deferring to
Congress for final determination of the patentability of a computer
program.
In light of the Court's decision to defer to legislative action for
a final answer, it is necessary to consider the weight and scope of the
Court's holding. The Court expressly limited its holding to refer
solely to a program similar to Benson's algorithm which had a practical
use only in a digital computer.'" Accordingly, a process used in another
apparatus, for example an analog computer, may be patentable if it
conforms to the requirements of the Supreme Court precedents
utilized in Gottschalk. Until congressional action on the problem is
taken, then, it would appear that a claim which discloses only an idea
giving rise to a method, or the result of a method, will not be found
to set out a patentable process. Whether the Gottschalk Court also
suggested that a process, to be patentable, must be tied to a machine
or must operate to change an article to a different state or thing is
questionable, since the Court merely observed that prior cases had
"argued" these points. However, even assuming that these passages in
the Court's rationale could not be used to show the unpatentability
of any of the processes recently treated by the CCPA, it is probable
that the same conclusion—that those processes are unpatentable-
would be reached on the basis of the Gottschalk holding alone. The
Court's reversal of Benson, which was merely an extension of the
earlier CCPA decisions, renders that whole line of cases immediately
suspect.' This suspicion is substantiated by the Court's total disregard
188 93 S. Ct. at 258 n.7.
189
 Id. at 257.
140 The CCPA was able to distinguish Benson, which involved solely the art of data-
processing, from most of its prior cases, which involved some subsidiary or additional art.
441 F.2d at 686. The court noted, for example, that in Prater the process was related
to the spectographic analysis of gases, while in Musgrave computers were used to process
seismograms. In Bernhart, the process was related to an apparatus for depicting three-
dimensional objects as two-dimensional drawings. None of these claims sought a patent
solely on a mathematical formula, as did Benson. Id. However, since there was no
device based on the use of scientific principles in these cases, this alone should be
sufficient to bar the issuance of a patent under the Supreme Court precedents.
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of the CCPA's reasonableness standard and "technical arts" rule, as
well as the Court's reliance on its ovtirn pre-computer decisions. Until
Congress acts on the matter, the Court is apparently reluctant to make
it any easier to patent a computer program, preferring instead to
maintain the status quo by reaffirming the more stringent prerequisites
of its precedents, which do not permit an extension of the scope of
a statutory process so as to include a computer program.
Conclusion
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Gottschalk the CCPA
had decided a series of cases which had gradually abandoned the
mental steps doctrine in favor of new guidelines which would permit
the patenting of mental processes under section 101 and section 112.
In establishing these guidelines, the CCPA failed to delineate clearly
the scope and purpose of the separate norms of the two provisions,
thereby weakening the fiber of its opinions. In contrast,, the Supreme
Court relied on its earlier pre-computer decisions, and made no mention
of the CCPA guidelines in determining that the Benson computer
program did not constitute a patentable process under section 101.
However, the Supreme Court made the same mistakes as the CCPA
when it discussed the statutory nature of the disputed claims without
clearly framing this discussion within the context of section 112.
Moreover, while apparently engaging in an historical survey of its
earlier decisions defining the boundaries of a patentable process, the
Court left the scope of its own guidelines for the patentability of
computer programs in doubt by failing to specify, whether these cases
were cited in support of its holding. Although the Court limited both
the weight of its holding by deferring to Congress and the scope of its
holding by restricting its application to similar algorithms servicing
similar computers, the practical effect of its holding appears to have
a greater weight and broader scope than that claimed by the Court.
' HOWARD B. BARNADY, JR.
Federal Courts—Admiralty Jurisdiction—"Maritime Locality Plus
Maritime Nexus" Required to Establish Admiralty Jurisdiction in
Aviation Negligence Cases—Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland.'—Petitioners' jet aircraft was departing from Cleveland's
Burke Lakefront Airport, adjacent to Lake Erie. The plane was bound
for Portland, Maine, to pick up charter flight passengers and then con-
tinue to White Plains, New York. After being cleared for takeoff by the
federal air traffic controller, the plane struck a flock of seagulls on the
runway as it began its ascent. The birds were ingested into the aircraft's
jet engines, causing a rapid loss of power. The plane fell, struck an air-
1 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
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